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1. Introduction
It is common to observe that Spinoza has no sympathy for revolu-
tion. In support of this contention, commentators point to his several
warnings about the futility of insurrections, to his critique of the pro-
tracted turmoil in England,1 and to his several remarks about the terri-
fying masses, who are all too willing to shed blood.2 With or without
impeaching his credentials as the intellectual forefather of the radical
Enlightenment, most find that the pessimism Spinoza exhibits about
the possibility of radical regime change (TTP 18 10) implies a condem-
nation of revolution in general.3 This strikes me as hasty for a couple of
reasons. Firstly, Spinoza does not use the word “revolution” in the polit-
ical sense, nor could he have done so. It was rarely used to refer to
political transformation in the 1600s, and was perhaps first used to
refer to a specific event in reference to the Glorious Revolution in 1688,
eleven years following Spinoza’s death. Whereas today revolution typi-
cally refers to an insurrectionary movement under the banner of uni-
versal freedom, the “Glorious Revolution” was the celebratory name
given to the events that restored the English monarchy. Secondly, and
more importantly, as Hannah Arendt remarks, “revolutions are more
than successful insurrections.”4 Insurrection and regime change can
just as easily be conservative or reactionary as revolutionary, and thus
Spinoza’s views on these phenomena are not necessarily the appropri-
ate place to discover his position on the question of revolutionary
change. 
Of course, we must then be clear about what revolutionary change
is. According to Arendt, “Only where [the] pathos of novelty is present
and where novelty is connected with the idea of freedom are we entitled
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to speak of revolution.”5 Revolution, for Arendt, is associated with a rec-
tilinear as opposed to a cyclical view of time. The ancients and
medievals understood change to be natural and inevitable, but also
repetitive and cyclical, bound to the laws of generation and corruption
governing all natural things. Revolution, in the sense of a radical rup-
ture with the past, is, on her account, a distinctively modern phe-
nomenon that depends on a view of history for which radical novelty is
not only possible, but can be initiated by human beings themselves.
Revolution, in this sense, is conceivable only when humans come to see
themselves as the authors of their destiny, as the architects of their
way of life, whose medium of existence is not the rigid lawfulness of the
cosmos, but freedom itself. On this understanding of revolution, it is
unclear whether Spinoza is among “the last of the medievals” or “the
first of the moderns.” It would be unsurprising if Spinoza were a cusp
figure who, like Machiavelli, was both ahead of his time and bound to a
classical perspective, such that he would be “fully convinced that expe-
rience has revealed every conceivable form of commonwealth”6 and that
“the nature of men” is constant and everywhere the same (TP 1 7, 5 2,
7 27).
Yet, if we understand revolutionary transformation not in terms of
radical novelty and rupture, but in the terms of Marx and Engels in
The German Ideology, I think we will find in Spinoza an ardent revolu-
tionary spirit. For Marx and Engels, revolutionary political transfor-
mation is the kind of change that forges an increasingly common inter-
est.7 The ultimate revolutionary movement is the one that organizes
the interests of its constituents into an effective unity, such that each
and every one, while striving for himself, brings about those effects that
benefit others as well. This is a plausible way to understand Spinoza’s
frequent assertion that his political principles are guided by the aim of
constituting a commonwealth that is guided “as if by one mind” (TP 6
1). And, thus, it is in this sense that Spinoza may be seen to outline a
revolutionary politics. We may justifiably see in Spinoza a modern ten-
dency, on Arendt’s account, since he advocates political and institu-
tional forms insofar as they support and amplify human freedom. Yet,
this freedom is less a radical power of invention, and more a power to
form an idea of one’s own welfare that harmonizes with the general
welfare and then to act according to it. Spinoza’s dictates of practical
reason, on my view, anticipate Marx and Engels, since political freedom
is greater insofar as what is represented as the dominant interest gen-
erates a truly common interest, which Spinoza envisions as a “union or
harmony of minds” (TP 6 4).
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It may seem that I am simply skirting the concern raised by those
who cite Spinoza’s grim view of insurrection. Spinoza, some might be
concerned, offers nothing like a right to resist tyranny. He notes that “a
people have often been able to change tyrants but are never able to get
rid of them” (TTP 18 7) and thus such attempts tend to be “foolish” (TP
5 7). Although Spinoza repeatedly remarks that toppling tyrants and
ruining the state is typically disastrous, he observes just as often that
the laws of human nature are such that the ruin of any particular
tyrannical state is inevitable. Oppressive circumstances give rise to
insurrection no less certainly than the earth revolves around the sun.
Spinoza invokes revolution in the astronomical sense of irresistible
rotation,8 but he grounds this change in the iron law of the conatus, the
striving to persist in and to enhance one’s existence (EIIIpost6–9).
There is, then, a sense in which Spinoza identifies the laws of human
nature themselves as revolutionary. All natural beings desire to perse-
vere in their being, and doing so effectively, according the laws of one’s
nature, is what Spinoza calls “freedom.” Spinoza maintains consistently
that the commonwealth only endures as long as its constituents vividly
imagine it to be a source of their power and freedom. Thus, to invoke
Marx and Engels again, if the ideas of the ruling class appear to be
alien or hostile to the ideas and aims of the many, according to Spinoza,
“they cannot help but wish [it] every calamity and inflict it themselves
when they can” (TTP 5 8). Thus, although Spinoza does not praise
insurrections, he warns his readers that they cannot escape them as
long as the irrepressible passion for freedom is disregarded.  
In what follows, I will substantiate the argument that there are at
least two senses in which Spinoza’s principles support revolutionary
change. I will begin with a quick survey of his concerns with the prob-
lem of insurrection. I will proceed to show that if political programs can
be called revolutionary, insofar as freedom is their motivation and jus-
tification, and insofar as freedom implies an expansion of the scope of
the general interest to the whole political body, Spinoza ought to be
called a revolutionary. Finally, I will contend that even if he does not
praise mass insurrection, he finds its guarantee in the laws of human
nature itself, which cannot tolerate tyranny. And, thus, it is in a revolu-
tionary vein that Spinoza cites Seneca repeatedly: violenta imperia
nemo continuit diu (TTP 5 8, 16 9).
2. Failed Uprisings
Spinoza observes that philosophers who attempt to write political the-
ory only ever succeed in composing satire (TP 1 1). Nevertheless, he
makes no claims of revolutionary novelty himself. Rather, he claims to
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take his cues from statesmen and political practice (TP 1 2), and to
apply a mathematician’s discipline to a careful observation of human
nature toward the end of deducing principles of effective political orga-
nization.
In turning my attention to political theory it was not my purpose to
suggest anything that is novel or unheard of, but only to demon-
strate by sure and conclusive reasoning such things as are in clos-
est agreement with practice, deducing them from human nature as
it really is. And in order to enquire into matters relevant to this
branch of knowledge in the same unfettered spirit as is habitually
shown in mathematical studies . . . I have regarded human affects
such as love, hatred, anger, envy, pride, pity, and other agitations
of the mind not as vices but as properties pertaining to it in the
same way as heat, cold, atmosphere, storm, thunder, and such per-
tain to the nature of the atmosphere. (TP 1 4)
In parallel with his Ethics, Spinoza invokes the attitude of the mathe-
matician when promising to analyze human affects (EIIIpref). It
requires a tranquility of mind to find in a history replete with quarrels,
rebellion, and war the pleasure of understanding human properties,
tendencies, and “laws.” Spinoza presumes that humans are everywhere
the same in that we are universally “subject to passions” (TP 1 5;
EIVp4), and thereby both enabled and constrained by our environ-
ment.9 How we behave, whether we tend toward violence or obedience,
reflects not our caste or class but the character of our commonwealths
(TP 5 2). Spinoza thereby rejects the idea that some people are bar-
barous by nature while others are noble and refined: “[A]ll men share
in one and the same nature; it is power and culture that mislead us”
(TP 7 27). From this presumption Spinoza can say that, although his-
tory yields infinitely many shapes of human organization, “experience
has revealed every conceivable form of commonwealth” (TP 1 3) and
sufficient data to deduce the “natural foundation of the state” from the
“nature and condition of men in general” (TP 1 7).
Consideration of human nature suggests to Spinoza that insurrec-
tions typically fail to bring about a better situation. The universal sub-
jection of humans to passions and the influence of external causes is
such that our agency is severely constrained by our histories, acquired
dispositions, and the powers and pleasures available in our social
milieus.10 Thus, from the same rule that entails that rebellion is caused
by a poorly organized commonwealth, it follows that those rebellions
are typically destructive rather than liberating. Let us consider this
principle more carefully. According to Spinoza:
It is certain that rebellions, wars, and contempt for or violation of
the laws are to be attributed not so much to the wickedness of sub-
GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL
4
jects as to the faulty organization of the state. Men are not born cit-
izens but are made so. Furthermore men’s natural passions are
everywhere the same; so if wickedness is more prevalent and
wrongdoing more common in one commonwealth than in another,
one can be sure that this is because the former has not done
enough to promote harmony and has not framed its laws with suffi-
cient forethought. (TP 5 2)
Because citizens have been, in his terms, “made” in a corrosive environ-
ment that encourages wrongdoing, division, and antagonism, one can
see “how foolish [imprudenter] are the attempts so often made to get rid
of a tyrant while yet the causes that have made the prince a tyrant
cannot be removed” (TP 5 7). Machiavelli teaches us that the causes of
tyranny “become the more firmly established as the prince is given
more grounds for fear” (ibid.).
Insurrectionary violence frequently produces a vicious cycle. Citizens
subject to oppression are typically “misled”; that is, they are prevented
from developing the resources to judge what is to their advantage, or to
do the arduous work required to bring about a more enabling situation.
They are typically unable to see the web of causal relations that holds
in place, not only the tyrant (and his henchmen), but also the desires,
passions, and circumstances that call for and sustain tyranny. They are
corrupted by their own suffering and driven, not by knowledge of what
is good, but by fear of pain and death, and by a desperate desire to
escape their current reality. Likewise, the prince, who is installed as a
result of insurrectionary efforts to negate the source of their oppres-
sion, is burdened by the living memory of what the violent masses can
do, while also being vulnerable to the disgraced allies of the former
ruler. Such a prince, even with the best intentions, is unlikely to be
able to train his mind on the general welfare. Instead, he is haunted by
danger on all sides, and especially by the image of his own people’s
bloody rage. As Spinoza presses, “[f]or how will he inevitably regard
citizens whose hands are stained with royal blood, citizens glorying in
parricide as in a noble act, an act which cannot fail to be an ominous
example for him?” (TTP 18 7).
Spinoza observes not only that it is exceedingly difficult to overcome
a history of violence, but, again in the vein of Machiavelli, that change
must respect the habitual constitution of a people. Those accustomed to
republican self-rule will never tolerate a monarch, and those habitu-
ated to following a king’s decrees will require nothing less than a collec-
tive transubstantiation in order to become capable of governing them-
selves (TTP 18 6–7). Thus, Spinoza arrives at the general maxim: “The
form of each state must necessarily be retained and cannot be changed
without risking the total ruin of the state” (TTP 18 10).
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It should be noted, however, that Spinoza issues these statements in
the mode of a warning: He observes that it is exceedingly “dangerous”
(TTP 18 7) to depose a monarch, and that changing the form from
democracy to monarchy, or the reverse, entails great “risk” (TTP 18 10).
Likewise it is frequently “imprudent” to get rid of a tyrant. None of
these claims are absolute imperatives. These are prudential maxims
meant to guide those seeking to transform the causes of tyranny. When
he speaks in the prescriptive mode, he says that the “contract or laws
whereby a people transfers its right to one council or one man should
undoubtedly be violated when the general welfare is violated” (TP 4 6;
trans. mod.). Yet he notes that the power to name the general welfare
cannot rest in the “private individual,” for, if it did, law would have no
binding power. Instead, the best commonwealth should establish provi-
sions by which critique of the rationality of its laws is built into its reg-
ular functioning.11 The best state gives as little cause for insurrection as
possible, because it installs mechanisms for its rational reconstruction
and for the participation and education of as many constituents as its
form allows (TP 7 27, 29).
In this section, I showed that Spinoza, indeed, has a grim view of the
ability of insurrections to overcome the suffering that inspires them.
From this observation of human nature, however, Spinoza certainly
does not arrive at anti-revolutionary principles of government; far from
it. In the following section, I seek to show that it is respect for the diffi-
culty of constituting freedom among those habituated to slavery that
guides his principles, especially in his understudied Political Treatise.
And it is his hope for the progressive, albeit gradual, liberation of the
entire multitude that makes him a revolutionary political thinker.12
3. Animorum Unione
According to Arendt, “the aim of revolution was, and always has been,
freedom.”13 If Spinoza has a claim to being among the “first of the mod-
erns,” it is because, as Steven Smith observes, he is the first major can-
onized thinker in the modern period to defend democracy as the best
form of government.14 He defends it on the grounds that it best accords
with the natural freedom belonging to man (TTP 16 8), an interpreta-
tion of which I will offer below. He might also be said to be modern
because, like Hobbes and Descartes, he does not recognize any intrinsic
differences between people and thus furnishes metaphysical bases for
equality.15 It is not just that Spinoza prefers the form of government
that best accords with natural freedom; it is also the case that his rec-
ommendations for any form of government whatsoever are animated
by the imperative to maximize the power of the commonwealth by uni-
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fying its constituents into “one mind.” I will defend the view that this
process of unification expresses his view of freedom, which is intrinsi-
cally revolutionary in the sense identified by Marx and Engels in The
German Ideology. No matter what form of government Spinoza dis-
cusses, he aims, as Balibar argues, to democratize it, to amplify the
power of the many through those institutions that enable as many as
possible to exercise reason—to think and act out of the pooled resources
of the commonwealth.16
In the Ethics, freedom is closely aligned with reason. We reason
when our minds are the “adequate causes” of their ideas. That is, when
an idea can be explained by the resources proper to a particular mind,
then that individual can be called free, active, and rational.17 Similarly,
Spinoza defines “virtue” as man’s power to bring about certain things
“which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone”
(EIVdef8). Importantly, one’s power to determine oneself rather than
suffer the haphazard effects of determination by external causes is
owed to what Balibar describes as the “transindividual” properties of
the mind.18 Although the word “transindividual” might sound peculiar
to some, this idea should not be surprising in reference to Spinoza’s
notion of reason. He describes the “common notions” that are “the foun-
dations of our reasoning” (EIIp40s1), as “those things which are com-
mon to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole”
(EIIp38c). All men have adequate ideas of the common notions because
they share certain properties with all other beings in nature. Because
an individual forms an adequate idea of what it shares with particular
bodies, it also forms local common notions with subsets of natural
beings (EIIp39). “From this it follows that the mind is more capable of
perceiving many things adequately as its body has more in common
with other bodies” (EIIp39c). The foundations of our reasoning, then,
are owed to our shared properties and are expanded the more we
encounter beings with which we share, or come to share, these proper-
ties. Individual virtue, then, depends upon common resources and is
enhanced the more one cultivates or encounters common resources.
Thus, although adequate ideas follow from one’s nature and are proper
to her mind, privileged sources of rational ideas are those that extend
beyond her particularity and express her connection to others. 
One might expect rationality to follow from what is universal and
thus be extra-individual, but we also find an affirmation of the transin-
dividual character of agency in Spinoza’s conatus principle, which
describes the striving to persevere in being peculiar to each and every
singular being in nature. “So the power of each thing, or the striving by
which it (either alone or with others) does anything, or strives to do any-
thing . . . is nothing but the given, or actual essence of the thing itself”
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(EIIIp7def).19 Something can be explained through a being’s singular
essence, or by one’s nature alone, so long as it follows from what lies in
us and what we have in common with others. Self-determination, or
freedom, then, is increased the more we can “join forces” with others
(EIVp35s). Accordingly, Spinoza affirms that nothing is more useful to
man than man, and that we ought to strive such that “all should so
agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all would compose, as it
were, one mind and one body; that all should so strive together . . . that
all, together, should seek the common advantage of all” (EIVp18s). 
Joining together to form a common body, with a common mind, and
a common project of perseverance would generate the greatest powers
of reason and maximize the freedom of each.20 Such a project, Spinoza
laments frequently, is incredibly arduous, if not impossible: “It rarely
happens that men live according to the guidance of reason. Instead,
their lives are so constituted that they are usually envious and burden-
some to one another” (EIVp35s; emphasis added). Perhaps Spinoza’s
pessimism about the ability to live according to reason prompts com-
mentators like Steven B. Smith to conclude that, for Spinoza, “[t]he
exemplary life culminates in the life of the free person engaged in the
solitary and virtually continual contemplation of God and the world . . .
whose thoughts and actions stem . . . from feelings of love and friend-
ship.”21 Although the image of the solitary sage contemplating God—
animated only by love and friendship—ignores the sociality that such
feelings of camaraderie presuppose, the not uncommon insistence that
Spinozan freedom can best be secured in isolation fails to make sense of
the persistent ethical vision of union found in his political writings.
Moreover, Spinoza notes that the failure to live according to reason fol-
lows from how our lives are typically “constituted.” Spinoza’s political
principles are guided precisely by an effort to constitute human lives
otherwise. Thus, in his Political Treatise, Spinoza declares the project
of unification on rational premises to be its guiding aim: “The body of
the state must be guided as if by a single mind” (TP 3 5).
The unification of the commonwealth echoes Spinoza’s description in
the Ethics of the rational wish to combine the totality of humanity into
a single mind and body. In both cases, it is reason that makes possible
the union of minds that Spinoza advocates. 
The commonwealth that is based on reason and directed by reason
is most powerful and most in control of its own right. For the right
of a commonwealth is determined by the power of a people that is
guided as though by a single mind. But the union of minds could in
no way be conceived unless the chief aim of the commonwealth is
identical with that which sound reason teaches us is for the good of
all men. (TP 3 7)
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The Political Treatise seeks to convince its readers that a strong and
enduring commonwealth is one that is “defined by the corporate power
of the people” (TP 3 9) and composed of restraints that compel its min-
isters to uphold the public trust “whether they are guided by passion or
reason” (TP 1 6). The art of government becomes the art of building
institutions that inoculate citizens and statesmen against the enchant-
ment of the Sirens’ song (TP 7 1) and thus enable and constrain as
many as possible to live “as reason prescribes” (TP 3 6).
The logic of the prescriptions emerges, in Balibar’s terms, as a “the-
ory of democratization, which is valid for every regime.”22 Some com-
mentators have puzzled over the shift in tone from the Theological-
Political Treatise to the Political Treatise. According to some, Spinoza
abandons his call for liberation from arbitrary state authority and
resigns himself to a realist analysis of power in his more dispassionate
tract.23 Yet, with Balibar, I find in the principles outlined for each com-
monwealth a consistent concern with the project of unification, which
can only be achieved by empowering as many people as possible to par-
ticipate in the processes of legislation and government. The theory of
democratization, then, is an institutional theory empowering the many
to think and act from common resources. It does not necessarily
express respect for certain modern democratic principles—such as
equality before the law—but rather affirms, in whatever regime, that
“the people’s welfare [salus] is the highest law” (TP 7 5). Observation of
that rule is visible in Spinoza’s frequent council for large deliberative
assemblies and for passing only those laws that garner significant sup-
port. Such institutional features enable the generation of peace, under-
stood as a harmony of minds, which also coheres with Spinoza’s notion
of freedom as an effect that enables combination. 
Importantly, the unity Spinoza advocates is not a passive submission
to a common rule of life, but the active production of a shared striving.
Such sharing, as Filippo del Lucchese rightly insists, in no way pre-
cludes conflict.24 Spinoza remarks that some enduring monarchies
appear peaceful, but they are in actuality deserts, populated by slaves
too diminished to overcome their desolate condition. “For peace is not
just the absence of war, but a virtue which comes from strength of
mind” (TP 5 4). Such strength of mind and social harmony is more
likely to be found in commonwealths that resemble, according to
Spinoza, quarrelsome families (TP 6 4). The best state provides mecha-
nisms for productive disputes, because simple obedience is insufficient
for a vibrant commonwealth. Even in monarchy, “the king’s sword or
right is in reality the will of the people” (TP 7 25) and “men, endowed
with reason, can never give up their right so completely as to cease to
be men and to be accounted as sheep” (TP 7 25). Although the aim of
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every form of government, according to Spinoza, ought to be the consti-
tution of una mente, “men should be governed in such a way that they
do not see themselves as being governed but as living according to their
temperament and by their own free decision” (TP 10 8; trans. mod.).
Common purpose is only possible in a commonwealth that produces vir-
tuous individuals, that is, individuals who pursue their interests as
their own: “When each man most seeks his own advantage for himself,
then men are most useful to one another.”25
In a similar vein, Marx and Engels describe revolutionary change as
the incorporation of increasingly many diverse interests into the com-
mon interest. A historical movement is revolutionary insofar as what is
represented as the general welfare succeeds in expressing the interests
of more and more constituents of the society in question.
For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling
before it, is compelled . . . to represent its interest as the common
interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal
form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent
them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making
a revolution appears from the very start, if only because it is
opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the
whole of society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting
the one ruling class.26
These remarks expose how the universal representation of the general
welfare can conceal its particular class interest, but the emerging class
meets the definition of being revolutionary only when its interest is bet-
ter connected to general concerns than the previous one. “Every new
class . . . achieves its hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the
class ruling previously.”27 Revolutionary change refers to the institu-
tion of a stable new social and political basis rather than to an
ephemeral eruption, or a displacement of rulers through insurrection.
The stability of revolutionary change is owed to its generalizing charac-
ter. It aligns more and more members and groups with the common
welfare by actually linking the concrete conditions of their well-being.
It is not by submerging the interests of the many into a dominant one
that a group gains its revolutionary power. Rather, what makes an
incipient power revolutionary is its ability to express, in Spinozan
terms, the common properties of those many interests.28
Although Spinoza does not obviously call for a militant uprising of
the oppressed on behalf of a classless society, he is concerned with
establishing the concrete conditions by which each member of the civi-
tas will be psychically and physically invested in the welfare of all. In a
monarchy, for example, he suggests that immovable property be held in
common so that “the danger from war is practically the same for all”
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(TP 7 8), and thus each and every one will defend the soil as his own. If
a commonwealth cannot find ways to coordinate the diverse interests of
its people, it will sow the seeds of its undoing. “Since the right of the
commonwealth is defined by the common power of the multitude,
undoubtedly the power of the commonwealth and its right is to that
extent diminished, as it affords reasons for many to unite in a conspir-
acy” (TP 3 9; trans. mod.). 
In this section, I have sought to establish the basis for what I am
calling Spinoza’s “revolutionary counsel”: Create a single mind among
constituents by democratizing institutions and social conditions,
thereby knitting together the individual and the general welfare. This
is revolutionary in that it involves a gradual expansion of the common
interest through the establishment of genuinely common grounds of
perseverance and mutual power. In the following section, I offer further
justification for calling this advice revolutionary, since, as Spinoza
emphasizes, failing to provide a real basis for harmony is sure to invite
insurrection.
4. Revolutionary Human Nature
Although Spinoza himself frequently refers to the “laws of human
nature,” it is awkward to speak of “human nature” in his philosophy. A
“nature” typically implies an essential feature that might define a
group. In order to define a group this feature must be predicable of
each of its members, without being predicable of any non-member. For
a philosopher like Descartes, all humans can exercise reason and free
will, and no other created being can do so.29 Spinoza, by contrast, never
identifies any feature that is exclusive to human beings, since the foun-
dations of reason exist in all natural beings. I thus agree with commen-
tators who maintain that Spinoza does not have a metaphysical concept
of human nature, understood as a human essence.30 Nevertheless, he
claims to deduce his political principles from a scientific study of
“human nature as it really is” (TP 1 4). We are alerted to the fact that
this nature is not necessarily exclusive to human beings, however,
when he writes: 
I should like to point out that all those things I have demonstrated
follow from the most essential feature of human nature in whatever
way it may be considered, namely, from the universal striving of all
men to preserve themselves. This striving is inherent in all men,
whether ignorant or wise. (TP 3 18) 
He could have added that this striving inheres in all beings, even those
we would call “inanimate.”31
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In the Theological-Political Treatise, this striving is first related to
all of nature, then to big fish eating smaller fish, and finally to individ-
ual things of whatever kind. There, he refers to the conatus principle as
“the supreme law of nature,” namely “that each thing strives to persist
in its own state as far as it can” (TTP 16 2). From this follows “a uni-
versal law of human nature that no one neglects anything that they
deem good unless they hope for a greater good or fear a greater loss,
and no one puts up with anything bad except to avoid something worse
or because he hopes for something better” (TTP 16 6). The laws of
human nature might reflect some complicated imaginative responses,
but they follow from the same principle that causes tiny fish to swim in
magnificent schools that bewilder their predators. The durability of a
commonwealth reflects the ironclad law of the conatus: Forms of associ-
ation last as long as they appear to their members to be in the interest
of those members. 
Spinoza’s social contract is less a juridical expression of rational con-
cord among equally valid perspectives than an expression of a common
imaginative perception of what is conducive to persevering in being. In
Spinoza’s words, “[w]e conclude from this that any agreement can have
force only if it is in our interest, and when it is not in our interest, the
agreement fails and remains void” (TTP 16 7). Thus, although Spinoza
does not herald a right to resist tyranny, he finds that state power
must always respect this law in order to endure; that is, it must always
appear to act in the interest of its constituents. Moreover, the most
effective way to appear to regard the common welfare as the highest
law, Spinoza contends, is to actually do so.32 He is perhaps knowingly
overstating the issue when he observes, “it can very rarely happen that
sovereigns issue totally absurd commands. To protect their position and
retain power, they are very much obliged to work for the common good
and direct all things by the dictate of reason” (TTP 16 9). To which he
adds, in what might be considered an admonishing tone, “for no one
has maintained a violent government for long” (ibid.).
The phrase “the laws of human nature” frequently appears in the
context of identifying the limits of sovereignty. For example,
There will never be a sovereign power that can accomplish what-
ever it pleases. In vain would a sovereign command a subject to
hate someone who had made himself agreeable by an act of kind-
ness or to love someone who had injured him, or forbid him to take
offence at insults or free himself from fear, or many other such
things that follow from the laws of human nature. (TTP 17 1;
emphasis added)
These “laws of human nature” include psychological generalizations
that ought to be taken into account in ordering a commonwealth. Such
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generalizations likewise typically refer to the inability of sovereigns to
manipulate their constituents past a certain point, beyond which the
ruin of the state is all but assured. The laws of human nature under-
line the irreducibility of human striving, and the certainty of resistance
to intolerable oppression.33
Although the human being is not a robust metaphysical category for
Spinoza—indeed, he advances one of the most powerful critiques of
human exceptionalism in the history of Western thought—the conatus
reflected in the laws of human nature contains the seeds of revolution.
It is the yearning not only to live but to live well that sets a limit to
every system of coercion. As Spinoza writes, “human nature does not
allow itself to be absolutely compelled” (TTP 5 8). When subject to a
violent regime, a people “cannot help but rejoice when their ruler suf-
fers pain or loss . . . they cannot help but wish him every calamity and
inflict it themselves when they can” (ibid.).
Yet, it is not only the exercise of overt violence in the form of threats,
brutal punishment, and the arbitrary taking of life that will come up
against the laws of human nature. Spinoza identifies what we today
might call “structural violence” as a cause of “major upheaval” (TTP 17
4).
Everyone knows what wrongdoing people are often moved to com-
mit because they cannot stand their present situation and desire
major upheaval, how blind anger and resentment of their poverty
prompt men to act, and how much these things occupy and agitate
their minds. To anticipate all this and construct a state that affords
no opportunity for trouble-making, to organize everything in such a
way that each person, of whatever character, prefers public right to
private advantage, this is the task, this is the toil. The necessity for
this has compelled people to devise many stratagems. But they
have never succeeded in devising a form of government that was
not in greater danger from its own citizens than from foreign foes,
and which was not more fearful of the former than of the latter.
(TTP 17 4)
Spinoza regularly invokes this fear that a state necessarily has vis-à-
vis its own people. This fear, he suggests, ought to constrain a state in
an effort to safeguard its reputation as an agent for the common good.34
Appearing to represent the common good, however, entails not only
promising a people’s survival or protection from the greatest evils, but
also respecting characteristic human aspirations. “So when we say that
the best state is one where men pass their lives in harmony, I am
speaking of a human life, which is characterized not just by the circula-
tion of blood and other features common to all animals, but especially
by reason, the true virtue and life of the mind” (TP 5 5). Invocations of
human nature in Spinoza’s text serve as a rallying cry for a govern-
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ment animated by true freedom as the collective constitution of reason
and the good life. Many commentators find that Spinoza’s Ethics aims
at private virtue and his politics only at ersatz freedom in the form of
obedience to the most basic moral precepts. Yet, we can discern in his
mantras of the one mind, his admonitions about the corrosive effects of
fear and hatred, and his affirmation of the irrepressible human striving
to enjoy powerful minds and well-nourished bodies, the outlines of a
revolutionary manifesto. 
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